Rule 501. Privilege in
General
A claim of privilege to
withhold evidence is governed by:
(a) The Constitution of the
United States;
(b) The Constitution of the
State of Utah;
(c) These rules of evidence;
(d) Other rules adopted by the
Utah Supreme Court;
(e) Decisions of the Utah
courts; and
(f) Existing statutory
provisions not in conflict with the above.
2011 Advisory Committee
Note. – The
language of this rule has been amended as part of the restyling of the Evidence
Rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology
consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic
only. There is no intent to change any result in any ruling on evidence
admissibility.
ADVISORY
COMMITTEE NOTE
It is in the
nature of evidentiary privileges that they interfere with establishment of the
whole truth. As a consequence, some members of the Committee thought that all
statutory privileges not important enough to be incorporated in Article V
should be expressly invalidated. Most members, however, felt that in spite of
the truth-impeding effect of privileges, the already-existing legislatively
created privileges should be preserved. Members of the majority expressed
various views:
(1)
Privileges reflect good policy choices, fostering candor in important
relationships by promising protection of confidential disclosures.
(2) Even if
the statutory privileges are not all wise, the legislature has by democratic
process resolved policy disputes and should not be lightly overturned. Under
the Utah Constitution, art. VIII, § 4, while the Supreme Court has the basic
power to establish rules of privilege, the legislature also has a role, since
it is empowered to make amendments by a two-thirds vote of all members of both
houses of the legislature. Even the Committee members who would abolish
statutory privileges recognized the dismaying magnitude of the task of
reevaluating every existing privilege separately.
(3) The
statutory privileges most often invoked are the traditional ones dealt with in
other sections of Article V. The other statutory privileges are relied on
rarely, if at all, so that their perpetuation will have almost no impact on
court proceedings. If problems involving these more exotic privileges do arise,
that is the time for the Court to deal with them.
Rule 501
acknowledges the existence of other privileges created by federal and state
constitutions, such as the exclusion of the fruits of unreasonable searches and
seizures, of coerced confessions, and of compulsory self-incrimination.
Rule 501 also
accepts all pre-existing statutory privileges, except those inconsistent with
these rules. In particular, Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-8, insofar as it defines
privileges relating to spouses, attorneys, clergy, and physicians, § 58-25a-8,
with respect to psychologists, and § 58-35-10, with respect to social workers,
are made ineffectual by the adoption of rules specifically redefining those
privileges.
The Supreme
Court has the power to create rules of privilege formally. It can also create
or reshape privileges by its decisions in concrete cases. However, the language
of 501, that there are no non-rule, non-statutory privileges, serves as a
declaration by the Court that it intends to operate normally through formal
rule-making procedures.
The Committee
made an effort to identify all the statutes in effect in 1989 that specifically
provided for a privilege. Other than privileges dealt with in other rules, they
are listed below. Statutes that merely imply the existence of a privilege are
also included, marked by asterisks. Even though the Committee's own search was
augmented by Judge Michael L. Hutchings' article "Privileges in Utah
Law," Utah Bar Journal 2:3:34 (Mar. 1989), there may be still other such
provisions.
Witnesses.
§ 78-24-9
(witness need not answer degrading question unless it is closely related to a
fact in issue or is conviction of a felony);
Grand jury.
§ 77-10a-13
(grand juror may not disclose how any juror voted, though grand juror can be
compelled to disclose what jurors said );
Interpreter.
§ 78-24a-10
(information communicated through an interpreter for the hearing-impaired that
is otherwise privileged);
Health care
data.
§ 26-3-9
(health care data collected by Department of Health);
§§ 26-25a-101
and -102 (communicable disease data collected by health departments) (cf. §
26-6-20.5);
§ 26-25-3
(medical information gathered for medical research);
§ 76-7-313
(information on abortions);
§
31A-22-617(4)(c) (health care data audited by Department of Health);
§§ 26-6a-6* and
-7* (test for AIDS);
§ 58-17-16*
(pharmacy may not release patient's medical profile except to drug law
enforcement or at patient's direction; the implication is that it may not be
obtained in civil litigation);
Professionals
working with social or psychological problems.
§ 58-41-16
(speech pathologist);
§ 30-1-37
(marriage counselor);
§ 58-39-10
(marriage counselor);
§ 30-3-17.1*
(communications to court-appointed domestic relations counselors working toward
marital reconciliation; subject to "public interests" under §
78-24-8(5));
§ 78-24-8
(sexual assault counselor);
§ 78-3c-4
(sexual assault counselor);
§ 53A-24-107
(individual information of persons being rehabilitated, except in enforcement
of law);
Results of
private investigations.
§ 58-12-43(7)
(information collected by professional committee investigating a doctor);
§ 78-14-15
(evidence presented to medical malpractice panel);
§ 34-38-13
(results of employer tests for drugs or alcohol);
§ 78-27-49 (no
private financial information obtained from a bank without court order
"shall be admissible");
Government
information.
§ 78-24-8
(communications to public officers in official confidence);
§ 35-9-14*
(trade secrets communicated to Industrial Commission can be used only in
enforcement of Occupational Safety and Health Act and then under protective
order);
§ 78-7-30(3)*
(information in proceedings before Judicial Conduct Commission "are
privileged in any civil action," except where subpoenaed in case
challenging judicial conduct as improper or except when judge does not resign
within 6 months);
§ 76-8-708
(college administrator "cannot be examined" as to information
obtained by procedures for enforcing school rules);
§§ 63-2-201
and 63-2-202* (confidential information in state archives);
§ 41-2-201*
(information provided by doctor or expert in physical, mental or emotional
disabilities in determining whether to issue a restricted driver's license to
an "impaired" person is "confidential");
§ 41-6-40
(compulsory automobile accident reports);
§ 54-4-16
(accident reports filed by public utility with Public Service Commission);
§ 41-6-170
(traffic convictions);
§ 77-18-2(4)
and (5)(records of expungement of conviction);
§
77-27-21.5(12)* (sex offender registration);
§ 77-18-1(4)
(presentence report);
§ 78-24-10
(compelled testimony about fraudulent conveyances);
§ 63-53a-6
(information collected by governor concerning state energy resources);
§ 73-22-6*
(logs of geothermal wells);
§ 40-8-8*
(confidential information communicated to Board of Oil, Gas and Mining
"shall be protected and not become public records" unless waived or
mining operation terminates);
§ 7-1-802*
(reports to Commissioner of Financial Institutions);
§ 70C-8-103(5)*
(identity of persons investigated by Department of Financial Institutions but
not subject of enforcement proceedings);
§ 13-11-7(2)*
(identity of persons investigated for consumer sales fraud but not subject to
enforcement proceedings).
In addition
to statutes which directly or indirectly create evidentiary privileges, there
are a great many statutes which seem to impose a professional or institutional
obligation of keeping confidence, yet do not clearly exempt the information
from subpoena. A great many of the provisions cited by Hutchings are of this
sort. A few examples are:
§ 78-3e-2
(identity of persons informing about drugs in schools, "shall be kept
confidential");
§ 26-4-17
(autopsy report is "confidential," though it can be released to
police, relatives, or attending physician);
§ 65A-1-10
(proprietary geologic or financial information communicated to Division of
State Lands and Forestry; the board "may" keep it confidential).